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Comment rationnellement peut-on imaginer les stratégies de menace, si l’on veut influencer 
les actions d’autrui? Dans cette conférence l’auteur essaie de montrer que les menaces de 
coercition ne fonctionnent pas dans des situations duelles sans contexte social. Il montre 
qu’elles fonctionnent seulement si on ajoute des éléments sociaux comme les institutions. En 
d’autres termes, les menaces efficientes entre sujets rationnels fonctionnent seulement si 
elles sont confortées par les institutions. C’est une sorte d’argument Hobbésien qui montre 
que dans l’état de nature le pouvoir social n’existe pas.  Le pouvoir social est une 
construction sociale 
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ABSTRACT 
 
How can one rationally imagine the strategies of threat if one wishes to influence the actions 
of others? In this paper, the author attempts to show that threats of coercion do not function 
in dual situations without a social context.  He shows that they only function if one adds 
social elements such as institutions. In other words, the effective threats between rational 
subjects function only if they are reinforced by institutions. It is a type of Hobbesian 
argument which shows that social power does not exist in the natural state. Social power is a 
social construction. 
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I.INVISIBLE EVIL IN PHILOSOPHY   
     
Evil has its own charm, its peculiar emotional and affective atmosphere, which can be 
motivating and stimulating. But it is difficult to find a place for evil in any normal social and 
cognitive scene; it is as if it did not exist. This is a philosophical scandal, an unmentionable 
truth. Of course we could, in principle, conceive of evil as a form of irrationality and anti-
normativeness, and this may be accurate. But at the same time we should not forget that evil 
has its own logic. Its ultimate irrationality does not become visible in any limited context 
defined by its users. If this is forgotten, we become entangled in curious problems about the 
possibility of a rational agent committing evil. There is no contradiction in a finitely rational 
agent's committing evil while making full use of his rationality, if his focus of interest is 
defined by the evil perspective which puts the relevant facts and considerations into 
perspective. This is what I try to show by focusing on coercive threats and their rationality in 
a praxiological view, that is, considering their effectiveness and efficiency.  
 
We may start the exploration of this scandalous topic by mentioning certain categories of 
evil that we must neglect in this short paper (Midgley, 1984, Airaksinen 1999, p. 7-20). In 
fact many types of evil exist, for instance, negligence, normative error and misconception, 
self-deception, lack of personal integrity and weakness of the will (with and without guilt 
and regret), and wickedness of the will proper, or what is sometimes called moral perversity 
(op.cité). All such distortions of virtue can be called vice. Let us, however, start from the 
concept of evil. What is the nature of the negative value, or evil? - that which does not fit any 
Rawlsian rational plan of life? (Rawls, 1971, p. 407- 416).  Or that which does not fit certain 
more specific plans? We will see that evil may fit in certain rational plans of life. 
 
To clarify the point about the rational nature of evil, I will first contrast it with pure error. 
When we look closely at errors, trying to explain their emergence not only verifying some 
occasional lapses of, say, concentration we run the risk of explaining one’s error in terms of 
more serious failures. But when a person errs he is not necessarily negligent or guilty of 
self-deception. The person may not fully understand what is right and good. In such cases we 
may still be tempted to explain the failure to act according to this moral knowledge as being 
due to the weakness of the will, which then leads to error in action, if not in planning and 
deliberation. But errors, at least random errors, do not raise questions concerning guilt, 
self-condemnation and remorse; this is because error is not wickedness. No guilt is 
necessarily involved in actions involving random errors, and even if the consequences are 
lamentable, the agent need not worry about them in any personal sense. Pure error is just bad 
luck. Some unpredictable causal circumstances interfere with the situation so that the agent's 
original intentions become inefficient. Thus errors seem to exist quite independently of 
self-deception, akrasia, and negligence, even though all these intrinsically problematic 
phenomena also entail a practical error somewhere in their structure. But it is also true that 
much evil exist independently of any error. Such evil may or may not be a result of a logical 
confusion. The case of successful coercion indicates the latter case. A coercer needs 
Praxiology of evil:  
Thinking about threats and their effectiveness 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 6 (1), 2008,   
http://ethique-economique.net/ 
3
knowledge when he plans his actions in a logical manner. Negligence, self-deception, and 
the weakness of the will are examples of the former case, in which error and illogicality 
reign.  
 
When explaining evil phenomena we might want to refer to purely accidental errors to 
diminish the role of moral failure. On the other hand, if we explain moral failures as 
something impossible or incomprehensible, their apparent wickedness must exemplify mere 
error, which would mean that no real wickedness or evil exists. This is false, however, as our 
moral intuitions demonstrate. We need to make room for planned and logical wickedness. 
Yet the fact that errors are possible without some of the more serious moral failures further 
reinforces one’s feeling of the problematic nature of wickedness.  
 
Simple error  has no inherent interest for ethics. If we assumed that all persons who actually 
fail in the moral sense are just stupid, misinformed, careless, drunk, or otherwise confused, 
the proper style of moral criticism would be disgust and ridicule. Certainly moral 
philosophers have been inclined to focus on cases exemplifying real and serious guilt rather 
than on such negative stylistic attitudes as disgust or ridicule. We should keep in mind that 
many instances of error and apparent evil are just results of random imperfections without 
any deeper meaning. It may happen that if such lapses of attention have catastrophic 
consequences, because of bad luck, then the agent is in trouble.  
 
Let us offer a tentative explanation: we think that wickedness exists, which explains our 
anxiety and fear; but at the level of moral theory we aim at the good and the right. This is 
due to the fact that human beings aim at their own personal good and cooperative goals, both 
because it is natural for them to think of their actions in positive terms, and also because they 
have learned how to handle their own social problems. Potential calamities emerge only if 
people do not work together and adopt common goals, norms and values. Therefore, for 
protective rhetorical reasons, our normative conceptual system is preoccupied with positive 
notions and even tends to define negative notions as entailing a mere exclusion of the 
positive elements. Negative notions have only a limited use so that the knowledge of evil is 
mainly presented in the form of myths, religion, and art. This means that the structure of evil 
is based on narratives. But the structure of the good is often said to be analytic and open to 
systematic inquiry from this point of view.  
 
All this may sound speculative, but it helps us to understand the persistent efforts at showing 
the main types of evil to be logically impossible. Our normative conceptual system is 
goodness-oriented and also committed to the idea of the good life in such a deep sense that 
only with the greatest difficulty does it allow us to make sense of bad or wicked things. 
Perhaps we find a taboo here. It is not really permissible to think of evil in any serious and 
detailed way, otherwise one may be taken to recommend it. Social censorship works. Artistic 
and mythological references are of course needed because they are likely to map the terrain 
and stimulate the mind, but to take evil seriously is to become wicked.  
 
In what follows I discuss a special case of evil in interpersonal relations, namely, the use of 
coercive power based on threats (Airaksinen, 1998,  1987-88). In this case two rational 
agents meet and they discuss their relevant positions, as if they could reach an agreement on 
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how to proceed. This is an illusion however. The moral evil in the situation makes the 
situation in some sense Anon-standard. But we will also notice that mere irrationality does 
not make coercive threats successful. Under irrationality the who situation collapses into 
meaninglessness, as one might guess. What is needed is an coercive institution. It is possible 
to institutionalize evil. Only in an institutionalized context can coercion work effectively and 
efficiently. This is a kind of anarchistic conclusion: institutions make evil possible in the 
praxiological sense. In sum: coercion is a perfect example of rational and logical evil which 
is not based on error but requires knowledge. Coercion also creates an illusion of co-
operation and choice, which tends to hide its true nature, especially in those effective and 
efficient institutional cases. 
 
II. THE ILLUSION OF COERCIVE POWER BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AGENTS 
 
A basic question of the praxiology of Ahard power is this: How are rational agents supposed 
to reason about their threat-strategies, if they want to influence another person’s actions to 
their own benefit? In this part of the paper my basic method is that of analytical philosophy 
combined with praxiology. I assume first that the agents we discuss here are rational 
individuals who want to maximize the outcome of their actions, in the usual way. Later I will 
relax this condition in order to create a more realistic situation. In such high stress situations 
as those of coercion and threats, agents may find it difficult to plan their actions according to 
the canons of rationality.  
 
I try to show that coercive threats do not work in two-person non-social cases, understood as 
strategic games. This may sound unintuitive on common-sense empirical grounds and it 
should be explained why this is so. 
 
 Description of coercion:  
Agent A threatens agent B by X (beating), when X is a disvalue to both A and B. A 
wants Y (money) from B. If and only if B does Y, A does not do X. For B, X is a 
greater loss than Y. Therefore, B does Y, and A is successful. All this is rational. B is 
able to minimize his loss by accepting the loss of Y and A gets what he wants. 
This is not unconditionally so, for the following reason. B has the choice of resisting A. If B 
refuses to do Y, A cannot get Y. But in this case A is committed to do X, or to realize his 
threat. But B can ask: Why would A do so? Now he cannot get Y and X as such is a disvalue 
for him (however small). Hurting B cannot intrinsically benefit A in any way but means, on 
the contrary, waste of energy and a risk of harm to the agent himself. Therefore A has no 
motive to do X, as B must realize. It follows that B can safely refuse Y, even when he is 
threatened by X. But if B is able to refuse on rational grounds, A cannot present an efficient 
threat.  A knows this all, as he is a rational and well-informed agent. In such a situation 
coercion never existed, against the initial stipulation that it did. A just pretended coercion. 
Coercion never gets off the ground, so to speak. All threats are just stylistic features in a 
violent and evil context. They manifest evil, nothing else. Only if B is scared or otherwise 
irrational, A may succeed. 
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Such reasoning works only if A is a rational utility maximizer. What happens if he is not? 
Suppose A may be irrational. Then B needs to reason as follows: 
 
If I refuse, I save Y but X may or may not happen B  because A is irrational it is 
impossible to predict what he will do. X may follow Y. Therefore, I must refuse to Y, 
because my own worst position is the loss of both X and Y, and I can save Y only if I 
refuse. I may then receive a beating but I save my money anyway. The worst case is 
that I get the beating (X) and lose my money (Y). This is what I must avoid. 
  
On these grounds rational A refuses to co-operate with B. A thinks he is in a winning 
position, and this is so regardless he gets (harmful) X in the end. 
 
The same reasoning is valid even if A is like a sadist and, as such, enjoys X. In this case X is 
no longer a loss to him. A will do X independently of what B does. A enjoys X, which 
makes B’s decision deterministic and clear. So, B should refuse to do Y. In this way B can 
save Y. B will get X anyway. Here A’s sadism is a form of irrationality as well, not because 
A’s behavior cannot be predicted B it can B but because it is based on his rigid emotions. His 
emotions are not sensitive to utility calculations, and in this sense they are B in a sense B too 
predictable. A does X however harmful it is to himself. His emotions which reward him of 
doing X are so overpowering that it does not matter how harmful X as such is to him. Such 
emotions are truly evil, as they harm both X and Y.  This is evil: it harms us all. Notice that 
in normal conditions A’s emotional tendency to perform X is conditional on the amount of 
harm X brings about to him. He does not beat B up if he thinks he gets a long prison 
sentence for it. Yet, if A really wants to do X, he may always deceive himself into believing 
that he can avoid the related harm. This is what evil people seem to believe. Their emotions 
make them epistemically irrational in the sense of , denial of truth, self-deception and 
weakness of will, as I said in the first section of this paper. Moreover, B has now way of 
knowing what evil thoughts A may entertain in their interaction. B’s best choice is always to 
refuse Y, or not giving A what he wants. A sadistic agent must look irrational to B. 
 
III. THE SUCCESS OF INSTITUTIONAL COERCION 
 
I show next that threats work only if we can add to their descriptions such social elements as 
institutions. In other words, effective and efficient threats between rational agents work only 
if suitable social institutions support them. This is a kind of Hobbesian argument which 
shows that in the State of Nature social power does not exist. Social power is a social 
construction. This also supports Hobbes’s idea that nothing is evil or wrong in the State of 
Nature. He thinks that social institutions bring about justice and, consequently, the 
possibility of evil as a failure of justice. Without institution all is chaos of force and violence. 
For instance, the two-person individual case of coercion is not coercion at all. It is mere 
violence. My argument establishes rational evil in a more direct sense: threats work only in 
an institutional setting and this constitutes the rational game of coercion B without mitigating 
its characteristic evil nature. Nevertheless, my argument is still Hobbesian in a broad sense 
of the term. 
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 The institutional rational rule of coercion is as follows: 
Only if A is an institutional agent is his threat position X convincing to B in the sens 
that the institution guarantees the realization of X just in case of not Y by B. In this 
case B should agree to Y B when B knows about A’s background. Coercion emerges 
as a type of effective interactive strategy 
 
If A is an institutional agent with, say, a reputation to lose (informal case) or a norm to 
follow (formal case), A will do X only if B refuses to do Y. This perfect state of affairs is 
due to the fact that A’s loss of reputation is more important than the disvalue of X.  In the 
formal case A acts according to the preset pattern he is programmed to follow. The informal 
agent may be a mobster and the formal agent a police officer. For the first type of an agent a 
failure means the collapse of identity and status whereas for the second it is mishap which, 
because it is against the rules, must not happen. The same can be said of a professional 
coercer, such as police. He cannot start negotiating around his threats. Notice here that even 
if some or even most of the police threats were both legal and just, as threats they would still 
represent prima facie evil. A possible world without threats is better that one where threats 
exist, ceteris paribus. Threats can be justified but they are still evil. Threats aim at intentional 
harm to persons and they submit an agent under another’s will. 
 
A dilemma emerges: (i) When evil is discussed objectively, as if from an outsider’s vantage 
point, the evil-making characteristics seem to disappear and so the object of study becomes 
distorted beyond recognition; but (ii) if we internalize the wicked position we become 
wicked, which we certainly do not want to happen. It is too easy to take the formal coercer’s 
viewpoint under the pretext of justice. This could be used as an explanation of the fact that 
even if goodness is accessible through systematic ethics and the social sciences, evil is not. 
Evil tends to vanish. I shall try to show that if to a certain degree we can make sense of evil, 
then we must take a detour via aesthetic regions and myths. This is to say that wickedness 
becomes a personal style and viciousness a myth, either personal or institutional. A good 
example is one’s reputation as a efficient coercer, or why not as a just officer? These are 
institutional myths which must first be created and then carefully nurtured ( Laver, 1982).  
 
A psychological possibility exists as well, as follows: A is not a sadist. Only if B refuses to 
do Y, A becomes specially motivated to act and do X, say angry; and this constitutes the 
crucial extra motive to X. But we need to ask, why would A become angry. Frustration, 
perhaps? The problem is that B cannot know about A’s psychological constitution in 
advance. Therefore B’s best bet may still be to refuse Y. If B can know about it, anger is a 
kind of institutionalized social fact. In this case the background institution of A forms B’s 
source of knowledge about A’s motives. 
 
As stated above, the crucial decision rule for B is the following one: because he cannot know 
what A is going to do, B must act so that the worst alternative will be eliminated. Clearly, the 
worst possibility is such that X and Y are both realized, for example B surrenders and loses 
his money and still gets beaten. He can avoid this fate by refusing to do Y, or what A wants 
from him. If B is lucky, no X follows. This is his ideal situation, but he cannot bring it about 
by means of his own decisions. Now, only if X is an institutional coercive agent, is it rational 
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for B to do Y. If A is indeed an institutional agent he will do X, if needed, and moreover he 
will not do X when he gets Y. This would ruin his reputation as well,  or be against the rules. 
This is to say that institutional threats and coercion can be effective and efficient to the 
degree that they become invisible. Both agents know the rules of the game even before it 
begins and both are able to anticipate their opponents’ actions so that no explicit threat need 
to be issued and no resistance is even considered. In a sense, B becomes an institutional 
victim who may fail to notice this fact. Evil is then fully embedded in an effective and 
efficient action context which is cemented by the relevant institutions. This is why so much 
of all the evil is not visible. It is part of a rational, social plan of life and its professional 
embodiment. Threats become invisible and in a sense accepted. 
 
From the praxiological point of view this is  to say that threats can indeed be Efficient and 
Effective, in Professor Wojciech Gasparski's sense ( Gasparski, 2000, p. 366-377).   I do not 
discuss his third E,  which is ethics. Instead I showed that the efficiency of threats can be 
evaluated only in a fully social context. In an ideal case threats need not be presented at all, 
since all agents know them anyway. This is a standard case in a society where hard social 
power is well organized and established. Effectiveness, or the goal directedness of action, 
presupposes that the coercer and his subject person share the social reality where they act so 
that both sides understand what can be done and what cannot. For instance the coercer must 
know what the victim is afraid of and what he considers a negative value. Because this is so 
difficult, many threats are based on violence, which is a universally feared disvalue. In this   
way my approach combines praxiology and the analysis of social action and its institutions.  
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